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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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December 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ  
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua (S)

As we enter the third year of the Administration's involvement in Central America, I believe it appropriate to examine the progress we have made; what further involvement we should consider; what adjustments can or should be made in our policy; and what options are available to us. (S)

Accordingly, the President has asked that you undertake a series of studies that examine the following subjects:

- (1) Generally speaking, the trends in Nicaragua may be viewed as favorable to the extent that opposition to the government is growing and becoming more effective. It is appropriate to ask what changes might conceivably take place if these trends continue. For example, could opposition elements effect a change in the government? If that appeared likely, what would be the reaction of the GON; of Cuba? Would Nicaragua seek to increase subversion in neighboring countries? How should we react to alternative Nicaraguan shifts in policy with or without Cuban support? (S)
- (2) What is the status of the Nicaraguan civilian opposition? Is it now able to provide effective leadership for Nicaragua should that become necessary? If not, what are we doing to improve this situation? Are there remnants of the National Guard leadership which could pose problems to the civilian opposition? (S)
- (3) What plans do we have if the present policies falter? What plans do we have to buttress opposition elements within Nicaragua? At what point does it become too costly, politically, for us to continue to support these groups? By what date do you expect this to become a problem? What plans have we made for this eventuality? (S)

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
NSC review completed.



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- (4) What measures ought to be taken to sustain and broaden where possible our support internationally?

These thoughts are prompted by what may appear to be an anomalous concern over "what do we do if we win?" No doubt you have already given this some thought, but I believe it would be useful for you to provide your assessment to the President near the commencement of the new year together with any recommendations you may have for altering current policies and programs.



William P. Clark

cc The Secretary of Defense  
✓ The Director of Central Intelligence